Completed: 5/16/2021
Recommendation: Recommended
Recommended By: My wife
Review:
This is an interesting look at the classic question of whether power corrupts or the corrupt seek power. The answer is both. The book argues that making positions of power representative of those who are not corrupt discourages the corrupt from pursuing positions of power. In addition, by monitoring those in power, this discourages corruption. There are various methods of performing both actions described in the book. The bottom line: if you anticipate paying a bribe to someone in power then people who want to receive bribes pursue positions of power and if you monitor the actions/bank accounts of those in power, then it is harder to receive bribes. So, make it clear that you don't want anyone bribing people in power and also make it clear (maybe through randomized tests) that people willing to take a bribe lose their power and this minimizes corruption. Of course, it is more complicated than that (otherwise a book would not be needed and a paragraph would suffice), but that is the quick and dirty example. Klaas goes into good detail explaining how the book was researched, why the conclusions were reached, and ways to implement the suggested approaches. All of this is good reading and excellent background. My biggest take-away is an example regarding analysis of military aircraft that had survived anti-aircraft fire (additional armor was needed where there were the fewest bullets because the aircraft had survived that damage, but the aircraft that failed to return had probably taken hits in the areas least hit by the surviving aircraft). This sort of reverse logic appeal to me and will likely stick with me in the long haul.
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